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There is a growing interest in assessing how cognitive processes fluidly adjust across
trials within a task. Dynamic adjustments of control are typically measured using the
congruency sequence effect (CSE), which refers to the reduction in interference following
an incongruent trial, relative to a congruent trial. However, it is unclear if this effect stems
from a general control mechanism or a distinct process tied to cross-trial reengagement
of the task set. We examine the relationship of the CSE with another measure of control
referred to as the item-specific proportion congruency effect (ISPC), the finding that
frequently occurring congruent items exhibit greater interference than items that are
often incongruent. If the two effects reflect the same control mechanism, one should find
interactive effects of CSE and ISPC. We report results from three experiments utilizing
a vocal Stroop task that manipulated these two effects while controlling for variables
that are often confounded in the literature. Across three experiments, we observed large
CSE and ISPC effects. Importantly, these effects were robustly additive with one another
(Bayes Factor for the null approaching 9). This finding indicates that the CSE and ISPC
arise from independent mechanisms and suggests the CSE in Stroop may reflect a more
general response adjustment process that is not directly tied to trial-by-trial changes in
attentional control.
Keywords: attentional control, congruency sequence effect, item-specific proportion congruency effect,
attention, cognitive control
INTRODUCTION
Attentional control is the ability to select relevant attributes from the environment for additional
processing while ignoring competing and possibly more salient attributes. The Stroop color naming
task (Stroop, 1935) is a classic test of attentional selection. In this paradigm, individuals are
presented with color words printed in colored ink (e.g., the word RED in blue ink) and are
instructed to name the ink color and ignore the word. The degree to which responses to incongruent
stimuli (where the color and word are different) are slower than responses to congruent stimuli
(where the color and word are the same) reflects the efficiency of attentional control.
A key theoretical issue is how control is recruited and/or adjusted across trials within a task.
Extant models have been informed by the robust finding that interference on Trial N is consistently
smaller when the stimulus on Trial N-1 was incongruent relative to when that item was congruent
(Gratton et al., 1992). This phenomenon is known as the congruency sequence effect (CSE).
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Importantly, the CSE indicates that some aspect of the stimulus
from the prior trial induces a change in the processing system
that influences performance on the subsequent trial(s). This
suggests that attentional control is not a static process but rather
is fluid and dynamic. A large body of research has since aimed
to identify the specific mechanisms that produce these trial
by trial adjustments in attentional control (see Duthoo et al.,
2014b, for a review).
Many accounts of the CSE have been proposed and one
of the most prominent is the conflict monitoring hypothesis
which suggests the conflict produced by the stimulus on the
preceding trial signals the system to upregulate control for the
following trial (Botvinick et al., 2001). This theory has been
able to account for a wide array of behavioral and neural data
(Botvinick et al., 2004). Importantly, the conflict monitoring
account suggests the CSE is fundamentally a modulation of
control processes and has inspired a flurry of research that has
aimed to determine whether the CSE truly reflects an adjustment
in control. Some of the earliest alternative explanations suggested
the CSE is actually produced by low-level feature characteristics
such as item repetition (Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al.,
2004) or response contingency (Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011).
Although such confounds certainly do contribute to the observed
effects, careful experimentation that has controlled for these
confounds has generally still produced the expected finding,
albeit reduced (Duthoo et al., 2014a; Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt
and Weissman, 2014). Together these findings suggest that
abstract properties (possibly conflict) of the prior stimulus are at
least partially responsible for cross-trial changes and hence the
CSE can be used as a marker of attentional control adjustment.
However, a number of studies have continued to challenge
whether the CSE is a control phenomenon or rather arises from
a more general trial-by-trial response adjustment mechanism.
For example, Schmidt and Weissman (2016) conducted detailed
analyses of prior trial response times and determined that the
CSE is consistent with a simple temporal learning model. That
is, participants tend to respond quickly after a relatively fast
response (which tend to be congruent trials) on Trial N-1
and relatively slowly after a slow response (which tend to
be incongruent trials) on Trial N-1. These expectations are
implemented via momentary drops in response thresholds such
that following a fast (congruent) trial, response thresholds are
dropped relatively early and following a slow (incongruent)
trial, thresholds are dropped relatively late. An early drop in
threshold would benefit a congruent stimulus on Trial N whereas
a later drop would benefit incongruent stimuli on Trial N,
producing the CSE pattern (see Schmidt and Weissman, 2016,
for computational details). It is important to point out, however,
that while the statistical models revealed a robust current trial
congruency by previous trial congruency by previous trial RT
interaction (which indicates the CSE is modulated by the prior
trial RT), the two-way interaction between current and previous
congruency still remained. Thus, we can conclude that temporal
learning may contribute to the magnitude of the CSE, but it is not
the entire story.
Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015) took an individual
differences approach and compared the magnitude of the CSE
as a function of age and working memory in the Stroop task.
They argued that because older adults and low-working memory
individuals have impaired attentional control, one should expect
these individuals to produce smaller CSEs. Instead, they found
the opposite pattern, namely that the CSE increased with older
age and lower working memory estimates. Furthermore, this
increase was driven primarily by differences on post-congruent
rather than post-incongruent trials.
The disproportionate influence of prior congruent responses
(Lamers and Roelofs, 2011) led Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015)
to propose a pathway priming account of the CSE. Specifically,
they assumed a two-pathway model of Stroop performance
(e.g., color and word pathway) in which activity accumulates
along each pathway until a response is made. When Trial N-1 is
incongruent, trials on which only the color dimension is relevant,
the color pathway is primed for use on the subsequent trial.
If Trial N is also incongruent, responses will be facilitated due
to the greater activity along the color pathway. However, when
Trial N-1 is congruent, the word pathway holds relative utility in
reaching the correct response, hence primes the word pathway
for use on the next trial. If Trial N is congruent, responses will
again be facilitated due to increased activity along the word
pathway, however if Trial N is incongruent, responses are slowed
as the additional activity along the word pathway now needs
to be controlled. Hence, the pathway priming model embodies
the assumption that individuals are constantly adjusting specific
procedures they utilize to achieve task goals based on the success
of those procedures (e.g., use of color vs. word pathway) on the
immediately preceding trial.
Of course, if this model is correct, then one should find
cross trial effects in other tasks such as lexical decision and
recognition memory, which are not tasks that place a heavy load
on attentional control systems, certainly not to the same degree
as the Stroop task. Indeed, there has been a recent flurry of
research which suggests that non-attentional tasks also produce
CSE-like patterns that can be interpreted within the pathway
priming framework (Malmberg and Annis, 2012; Balota et al.,
2018; Aschenbrenner et al., 2017; Hubbard et al., 2017).
As noted, most recent research has tried to address whether
the CSE reflects control by eliminating all possible confounds
(e.g., feature level characteristics) to ensure that some CSE is
still obtained. We take an alternative approach here. Specifically,
we examine these issues through the lens of the additive factors
framework (Sternberg, 1969) which suggests that additive effects
of two variables (i.e., reliable main effects but no interaction)
indicate each variable influences a separate or independent
processing stage whereas variables that interact influence a shared
stage. For example, in the classic short-term memory scanning
study where participants are shown a series of digits and asked to
determine if a target probe is or is not contained in the presented
array, it has been shown that the perceptual quality of the probe
is additive with regards to the size of the memory set to be
searched (Sternberg, 1967). Sternberg concluded that stimulus
degradation and memory set size must each influence a separate
processing stage. Of course, such an account is not the only way
to interpret additive effects (e.g., McClelland, 1979), however the
independent stages model has been shown to best accommodate
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the relationship among mean reaction times and the associated
variances (Roberts and Sternberg, 1993, see Balota et al., 2013 for
similar interpretation of the additivity of degradation and word
frequency in the lexical decision task).
In the present study, we used additive factors logic to examine
whether the CSE involves attentional control adjustments by
exploring the relationship between the CSE and an established
marker of attentional control adjustment, the item-specific
proportion congruency effect (ISPC: Jacoby et al., 2003).
Specifically, it has been repeatedly shown that the magnitude of
interference on any given trial depends on the overall frequency
with which that particular item is congruent or incongruent. That
is, items which are mostly congruent (MC items) exhibit greater
interference than items that are mostly incongruent (MI items).
This finding has been interpreted as evidence for a rapid retrieval
or adjustment of control settings that occurs post-stimulus onset
(Blais et al., 2007). For example, if the word GREEN is typically
incongruent, control over the word pathway would be increased
when GREEN is encountered in the list. Using additive factors
logic, if the CSE is due to an adjustment in control processes,
then it should interact with the ISPC. In contrast, if the CSE is
the result of some other, non-control based mechanism (such as
pathway priming), one would expect additivity to prevail.
We conducted a modified vocal Stroop task in which the CSE
was examined following biased ISPC items (i.e., mostly congruent
or mostly incongruent) or unbiased (50% congruent) items.
As already indicated, exact repetition of stimuli can artificially
magnify the CSE and hence repetition of stimuli or responses
should be precluded from the design. This is typically done by
expanding the size of the stimulus set (e.g., by using at least four
colors in the Stroop task). However, this standard manipulation
produces another confound, specifically a contingency bias such
that the word dimension predicts the correct response more often
than would be expected by chance alone which can also influence
the observed CSE (Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011).
Therefore, in order to provide a confound-minimized test of
CSE processes in the current study, the following procedure was
implemented (Kim and Cho, 2014; Aschenbrenner and Balota,
2017). First, we created a set of Stroop stimuli that consisted
of eight colors and eight color words which were placed into
pairs. Incongruent items were always shown in the color of the
opposite item of the pair. For example, if RED and BLUE form
one pair, an incongruent BLUE stimulus would always be shown
in the color RED and never in any other color. Such a procedure
eliminates the contingency confound, and as long as different
pairs are sampled across adjacent trials exact repetitions of items
and responses are also precluded.
As an overview of the experiments, Experiment 1 examined
the relationship between the CSE and the ISPC in young
adults using a vocal Stroop paradigm that eliminates all
confounds that have been previously identified in the literature.
Experiment 2 examined the same effects in a sample of older
adult participants, a group of people who have been shown
to have difficulties in attentional control and therefore should
produce larger overall effects and may increase our power to
detect interactive influences. Finally, Experiment 3 eliminated a
potential alternative account of the ISPC (associative learning) to
ensure that the present ISPC is indeed a reflection of attentional




Thirty-two young adults (78% female; mean age = 19.7 years,
SD = 1.4) were recruited from the Washington University
Psychology undergraduate research pool. All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and participated for research credit
or monetary compensation. A power analysis using the Bayes
factor design analysis (BFDA) package (Schönbrodt, 2018) in R
indicated that a sample size of 32 would give approximately 70%
power to obtain an interpretable Bayes factor (i.e., greater than
three) in favor of a difference in the CSE as a function of the ISPC
using a paired t-test, assuming a moderate effect size (Cohen’s D
ranging from 0.45 to 0.65). Similarly, we had approximately 72%
power to obtain a Bayes factor larger than three in favor of the
null, assuming a true effect size of 0.
Stimuli
The stimulus set and the frequency of presentation of each item
is shown in Table 1. The four pairs of items were presented
with differing frequencies such that items from one pair were
congruent 75% of the time (thus forming a mostly congruent:
MC item set) and items from a different pair were only congruent
25% of the time (mostly incongruent: MI items). The final two
pairs were 50% congruent, one of which was designated “neutral”
items and the other as the “critical” items. The neutral items
were intended to serve as a control condition to assess the CSE
when the prior trial did not contain a frequency manipulation
(consistent with prior examinations of the CSE). The critical
items were used to assess the magnitude of the CSE. Importantly,
while both the neutral and critical items are 50% congruent,
only the critical items were experimentally controlled such that
they followed each item type (MI, MC, and neutral) with equal
probability. This insures that an equal number of trials occurred
in each of the four cells that make up the CSE. The item pairs
(e.g., RED always with BLUE) were kept the same but were
rotated through the conditions such that each set of items was
a MI, MC, neutral, or critical item across participants.
Procedure
The experiment began with a demonstration block in which
each of the eight colors were shown as colored squares and the
participant was asked to name them aloud. This was followed
by a 23 item practice block which mimicked the structure of
the test (i.e., mostly congruent items were more frequently
presented in their matching color and so forth). During practice,
corrective feedback was given as necessary (e.g., “speak more
loudly,” “remember to name the color not the word,” etc.). After
the practice block, the test itself began, illustrated in Figure 1.
The test phase consisted of 1152 trials with 12 rest breaks
programmed throughout. In both the practice and test blocks,
the Stroop stimulus was displayed in the center of the screen for
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TABLE 1 | Stimuli frequencies in Experiments 1 and 2.
Word Dimension
Critical Items MI Items MC Items Neutral Items









Critical items: 50% congruent, used to examine the CSE; MI items: mostly incongruent; MC items: mostly congruent, Neutral items: 50% congruent.
5000 ms or until a verbal response by the participant triggered the
microphone. The participant’s response initiated a blank screen
while the experimenter coded the response as correct, incorrect
or microphone error (e.g., stutters, speaking too softly etc.).
Once the response was coded, a 1000 ms blank screen inter-
trial interval was initiated prior to the presentation of the next
stimulus. The Washington University Institutional Review Board
approved all procedures.
Analysis
To avoid the influence of outlier RTs, individual’s data were
trimmed using the following method. First, microphone errors
were removed followed by any valid response trial that was faster
than 200 ms (presumed to be fast guesses or an undetected
microphone error). Next, RTs that were faster or slower than
three standard deviations from the participant’s mean were
removed. Finally, we also eliminated the first trial after each
break, trials that occurred after an error and any trial immediately
following when the experimenter took longer than 5 s to code
the response. This trimming strategy eliminated 7.4% of the
total responses.
The data were then split into critical items (used for the
CSE analysis) and “biased” items (MC, MI, or neutral) for an
analysis of the ISPC. RTs were z-scored to each individual’s
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of task structure.
mean and standard deviation within each set of items to control
for individual differences in overall speed and ability (Faust
et al., 1999). Raw mean RTs are provided in the Supplementary
Materials. Mean z-scored RTs were calculated for each of the
critical cells for analysis. The condition means were analyzed
using a Bayesian linear mixed effects model using the rjags
package (Plummer, 2016). For the ISPC analysis, the condition
means included congruency (congruent vs. incongruent items)
and item type (MC vs. MI vs. Neutral). For the CSE analysis, the
condition means reflected the three-way crossing of congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent items), previous trial congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent) and the previous item type (MC, MI,
or neutral). In order to generate representative and stable
estimates, we ran three chains of 100,000 samples from the
posterior distribution and excluded the first 1,000 as burn-in for
each analysis. After checking that the chains converged using
the Gelman and Rubin R̂ statistic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992),
we collapsed across the chains to analyze the posteriors. Mean
z-scored RTs were analyzed as a combination of the conditions
(defined above) and a random effect of subject. Each beta weight
was given a broad (uninformative), normally distributed prior.
Results are presented as a point estimate together with the 95%
highest density interval (HDI), e.g., effect = X, HDI = Y:Z). An
effect can be called “significant” if the HDI does not include
zero. Finally, we provide Bayes Factor of the critical effects
using the Savage-Dickey density ratio (Wagenmakers et al.,
2010) as a quantification of the evidence for a given hypothesis.
Conventionally, a Bayes Factor between 3.2 and 10 represents a




The first and necessary step in our analysis is to demonstrate that
an ISPC effect was obtained in our modified design. Condition
means are displayed in Figure 2. The main effect of Stroop
congruency was large and significant (Mean effect = 0.794,
HDI = 0.718:0.871) indicating responses were 0.794 standard
deviations slower to incongruent relative to congruent stimuli.
More importantly, this effect interacted with the type of item (i.e.,
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FIGURE 2 | ISPC effect in Experiment 1. Error bars represent the 95% HDI.
there was an ISPC). Specifically, relative to the neutral condition,
interference was greater for the MC items (Mean effect = 0.256,
HDI = 0.069:0.441) and was smaller for the MI items (Mean
effect = −0.269, HDI = −0.454:−0.082). Thus, the ISPC effect is
readily apparent even under these highly controlled conditions.
CSE analysis
Figure 3 plots the CSE (post-incongruent interference minus
post-congruent interference) as a function of each item type
and the cell means are shown in Table 2. It is important
FIGURE 3 | CSE in Experiment 1. Error bars represent the 95% HDI.
TABLE 2 | Mean z-scored RTs (and HDIs) for each condition in the CSE analysis
of Experiment 1.
Previous Congruent Previous Incongruent
MI Items
Congruent −0.441 (−0.513:−0.370) −0.265 (−0.336:−0.194)
Incongruent 0.324 (0.253:0.395) 0.366 (0.295:0.438)
Neutral Items
Congruent −0.400 (−0.471:−0.329) −0.278 (−0.350:−0.208)
Incongruent 0.326 (0.255:0.397) 0.348 (0.278:0.420)
MC Items
Congruent −0.418 (−0.489: −0.348) −0.224 (−0.297: −0.155)
Incongruent 0.360 (0.289:0.431) 0.408 (.338 :.480)
to remember that “item type” refers to the prior trial in
this analysis as the current trial was always unbiased. As
before, the Stroop effect averaged across all conditions was
significant (Mean effect = 0.693, HDI = 0.652:0.734). Importantly,
the magnitude of interference varied as a function of prior
trial congruency producing the CSE, (Mean effect = −0.126,
HDI = −0.208:−0.044). However, there was no evidence of an
interaction between the CSE and the prior item type indicating
that the CSE was of comparable magnitude regardless of
whether it followed an MC, MI, or neutral item. Specifically,
the HDI of the beta weight comparing the CSE following
MC items to the CSE following neutral items was wide and
encompassed zero (Mean effect = −0.046, HDI = −0.248:0.151,
Bayes Factor = 8.88) as did the comparison between MI and
neutral (Mean effect = −0.034, HDI = −0.236:0.165, Bayes
Factor = 9.21). These results indicate that although there is a
clear effect of the congruency of the previous trial (the significant
CSE) and the probability of the previous item being mostly




For the ISPC items, the Stroop effect was significant (Mean
effect = −0.036, HDI = −0.044:−0.027) indicating more errors
to incongruent items relative to congruent items. Furthermore,
interference was larger for MC items relative to neutral (Mean
effect = −0.024, HDI = −0.044:−0.002) and also relative to MI
items (Mean effect = −0.036, HDI = −0.057:−0.015). However,
the MI and Neutral items did not differ from one another (Mean
effect = 0.013, HDI =−0.008:0.034).
CSE analysis
Looking at the critical items to assess the CSE, the Stroop effect
was significant (Mean effect = −0.032, HDI = −0.039:−0.025) as
was the CSE (Mean effect = 0.023, HDI = 0.010:0.036). However,
none of the interactions with prior item type were significant.
Specifically, the HDI of the beta weight comparing the CSE
following MC items relative to neutral items was large and
encompassed zero (Mean effect = 0.01, HDI = −0.019:0.046,
Bayes Factor = 43.49) as was the CSE following MI items relative
to neutral (Mean effect = 0.01, HDI = −0.028:0.038, Bayes
Factor = 56.76).
Interim Discussion
The primary result from this experiment is that the CSE and
ISPC both produce highly reliable effects but are additive with
one another. This provides initial evidence that the ISPC and
CSE reflect separate and independent mechanisms. The evidence
for the independence of these two factors was quite large
(∼9 times in favor of the null when testing the three-way
interaction, as reflected by the Bayes Factor). However, there are
a number of additional reasons that might account for the null
interaction we obtained. We report two additional experiments
that address these possibilities. First, it is possible that we did
not have a sufficiently strong CSE to detect the hypothesized
interaction. Although highly reliable, the CSE is relatively small,
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at least when compared to the size of the overall Stroop effect.
Thus, in order to both replicate our original finding and address
the effect size issue, we conducted the same experiment again
with an older adult sample. Older adults typically produce a larger
CSE in the Stroop task relative to younger adults (Aschenbrenner
and Balota, 2017) and therefore, if the null is simply due to the
relatively small magnitude of the CSE, we may be more likely to
detect the interaction in this population.
EXPERIMENT 2
Participants
A group of 32 healthy older adults (59% female; mean age = 72.7,
SD = 4.3) were recruited from the St. Louis community.
Participants were given $25 for their time and effort.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli, procedure and analysis were identical to
Experiment 1. Our trimming method eliminated 6.7%




Condition means for the ISPC effect are shown in Figure 4.
As expected, there was a significant Stroop effect (Mean
effect = 0.847, HDI = 0.766:0.930) indicating responses were
slower to incongruent relative to congruent items. Furthermore,
the interference effect was larger for MC items relative to
neutral (Mean effect = 0.267, HDI = 0.067:0.465) and smaller
for MI items relative to neutral (Mean effect = −0.260,
HDI =−0.457:−0.06), reflecting the ISPC effect.
CSE analysis
The CSE as a function of prior item type is shown in Figure 5
and the individual cell means are shown in Table 3. Once
again, we observed a significant interference effect (Mean
effect = 0.817, HDI = 0.774:0.860) as well as a significant CSE
(Mean effect =−0.149, HDI =−0.234:−0.062) indicating smaller
interference effects following an incongruent stimulus. Critically,
the CSE did not interact with the prior item type. Specifically,
the HDI for the difference between prior MI and prior neutral
trials was wide and included zero (Mean effect = −0.058,
HDI = −0.268:0.149, Bayes Factor = 8.09) as was the HDI of
FIGURE 4 | ISPC effect in Experiment 2. Error bars represent the 95% HDI.
FIGURE 5 | CSE in Experiment 2. Error bars represent the 95% HDI.
TABLE 3 | Mean z-scored RTs (and HDIs) for each condition in the CSE analysis
of Experiment 2.
Previous Congruent Previous Incongruent
MI Items
Congruent −0.495 (−0.570:−0.421) −0.336 (−0.411:−0.262)
Incongruent 0.431 (0.356:0.505) 0.418 (0.343:0.493)
Neutral Items
Congruent −0.493 (−0.568:−0.419) −0.322 (−0.396:−0.247)
Incongruent 0.370 (0.296:0.444) 0.427 (0.353:0.501)
MC Items
Congruent −0.402 (−0.476:−0.328) −0.355 (−0.430:−0.281)
Incongruent 0.481 (0.408:0.557) 0.368 (0.293:0.442)
the difference between prior MC and prior neutral items (Mean
effect =−0.047, HDI =−0.256:0.159, Bayes Factor = 8.51).
Accuracy
ISPC analysis
In the analysis of accuracy rates, the Stroop effect was significant
(Mean effect = −0.022, HDI = −0.028:−0.015). Interference
was larger for the MC items relative to neutral (Mean
effect = −0.020, HDI = −0.035:−0.004) but the MI and neutral
items did not differ from one another (Mean effect = 0.005,
HDI =−0.010:0.021).
CSE analysis
In the analysis of the CSE items, the Stroop effect was reliable
(Mean effect = −0.017, HDI = −0.021:−0.013) but there was no
CSE (Mean effect = 0.002, HDI =−0.01:0.006). Furthermore, the
CSE following MC items did not differ from neutral items (Mean
effect = −0.002, HDI = −0.02:0.018, Bayes Factor = 101.88) nor
did the MI items differ from neutral (Mean effect = −0.004,
HDI =−0.023:0.015, Bayes Factor = 93.03).
Discussion
We replicated our initial findings of additive effects of the CSE
and ISPC in an older adult cohort. The ISPC itself was large
and significant which suggests that control settings are being
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modulated on those trials. Furthermore, the CSE itself was also
significant indicating responses are being adjusted based on the
congruency of the prior trial regardless of whether it was an MI,
MC or neutral item. Importantly, a simple ANOVA confirmed
that the cross-experiment Age by CSE interaction was reliable,
F(3,186) = 3.13, p = 0.03, indicating that older adults produced
larger CSEs compared to younger adults, collapsed across ISPC
conditions, replicating the recent Age × CSE interaction that
was reported by Aschenbrenner and Balota (2017). Moreover,
the present replication and extension of Experiment 1 to an
older adult sample again suggests that the CSE and ISPC reflect
distinct mechanisms.
Before reaching such a conclusion, there is one final possibility
regarding these additive effects that remains to be evaluated.
Specifically, although we motivated the current experiments
under the notion that the ISPC reflects an adjustment in control
processes (i.e., when an MI item is encountered control is
rapidly increased), an important alternative account of the ISPC
is one of associative stimulus-response learning. For example,
if BLUE is most frequently presented in the color red (hence
is a mostly incongruent item), participants can learn that
when the stimulus is the word BLUE they should respond
with “red” (Schmidt and Besner, 2008). Indeed, a number
of studies have suggested that once this contingency bias is
experimentally controlled for, ISPC effects disappear (Schmidt
and Besner, 2008; Schmidt, 2013; Hazeltine and Mordkoff,
2014). Thus, under this scenario the ISPC may not be an issue
of control but rather a reflection of associative learning and
therefore one many not expect to observe an interaction between
the ISPC and CSE.
Of course, it is important to note that we included
“neutral” items in our ISPC design, that is, items that were
always 50% congruent. Therefore, if the MI or MC items
invoked an associative learning mechanism, one would still
have expected to obtain an interaction whereby the neutral
items (which must be resolved via attentional control) interact
with the CSE but not the biased items (which may reflect
associative learning). This presents some initial evidence that
associative learning processes may not be the entire story in
the first two experiments. However, to further address this
important concern, we conducted a final experiment in which we
attempted to minimize the contribution of an associative learning
mechanism. We do this by drawing on the Associations as
Antagonists to Top-Down Control (AATC) hypothesis proposed
by Bugg (2014). Specifically, Bugg argued that contingency
biases typically produce the ISPC under most circumstances
but when contingencies are accounted for, conflict adaptation
processes then take over. For example, in an experiment when
associative learning processes would be expected to be quite
strong (e.g., when MI items only occur in one other color, red
always in BLUE), no evidence of conflict adaptation was observed
(there was no list-wide proportion congruency effect). However,
when associative learning was lessened by simply increasing
the number of response options, (e.g., when the word blue
could occur in RED or GREEN), conflict adaptation was again
observed. Thus, when reliable S-R associations can form (see
blue respond RED), modulations of control are minimal whereas
when the associations are not reliable (see blue respond either
RED or GREEN) control adjustments are more likely prevail.
Thus, as a final attempt to address the concern that associative
learning processes are producing the ISPC in our studies, we
followed Bugg (2014) by increasing the stimulus-response set




Sixty-six participants were recruited from the Psychology
Department undergraduate research pool (67% female; mean
age = 19.5, SD = 1.2). Our power analysis showed that this sample
size gave 95% power for a meaningful (greater than three) Bayes
factor in favor of the alternative hypothesis (assuming a moderate
effect size) and 82% power to obtain a meaningful Bayes factor in
favor of the null (assuming effect size of 0).
Stimuli
The stimuli were the same as those used in Experiments 1 and
2. However, as shown in Table 4, the frequency of presentation
of each item has changed. Specifically, we eliminated the neutral
items and now presented 3 MC items and 3 MI items which were
TABLE 4 | Stimuli frequencies in Experiment 3.
Critical Items MI Items MC Items
RED BLUE BLACK YELLOW PURPLE WHITE ORANGE GREEN
RED 36 36
BLUE 36 36
BLACK 16 24 24
YELLOW 24 16 24
PURPLE 24 24 16
WHITE 48 8 8
ORANGE 8 48 8
GREEN 8 8 48
Critical items: 50% congruent, used to examine the CSE; MI items: mostly incongruent; MC items: mostly congruent.
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counterbalanced and rotated across participants. In this way,
we reduced the ability to rely on associative learning to resolve
the interference on the biased items.
Procedure
The procedure was very similar to Experiments 1 and 2 with
the exception of the stimulus configurations detailed above and
that only 528 trials were presented with 36 practice items and
7 pre-programmed breaks. These changes were implemented to
reduce the length of the experiment. We increased our sample
size to compensate for these lower trial counts and also to increase
our overall power. The analysis and trimming procedures
were otherwise identical to the previous two experiments





The condition means for the ISPC analysis are shown in Figure 6.
There was a large and significant Stroop interference effect (Mean
effect = 0.844, HDI = 0.800:0.888) which interacted with item
type. Specifically, interference was larger for MC items relative
to MI items (Mean effect = 0.404, HDI = 0.316:0.492). Thus, even
though the associative learning confound was minimized in this
design, we are still able to detect a large ISPC effect.
CSE analysis
The CSE means are displayed in Figure 7 and the cell means
are shown in Table 5. The interference effect was reliable (Mean
effect = 0.872, HDI = 0.825:0.919) and interacted with prior trial
congruency (Mean effect = 0.149, HDI = 0.056:0.242) reflecting
FIGURE 6 | ISPC effect in Experiment 3. Error bars represent the 95% HDI.
FIGURE 7 | CSE in Experiment 3. Error bars represent the 95% HDI.
TABLE 5 | Mean z-scored RTs (and HDIs) in each condition for the CSE analysis
of Experiment 3.
Previous Congruent Previous Incongruent
MI Items
Congruent −0.543 (−0.609:−0.476) −0.375 (−0.441:−0.309)
Incongruent 0.468 (0.402:0.534) 0.467 (0.402:0.533)
MC Items
Congruent −0.489 (−0.555:−0.423) −0.335 (−0.401:−0.269)
Incongruent 0.392 (0.327:0.459) 0.416 (0.351:0.483)
the standard CSE. However, there was still no evidence of an
interaction with the prior item type (Mean effect = −0.038,
HDI =−0.221:0.150, Bayes Factor = 9.73).
Accuracy
ISPC analysis
For the ISPC items, the average Stroop effect was significant
(Mean effect = −0.038, HDI = −0.048:−0.028) and this effect
interacted with the prior item type (Mean effect = 0.031,
HDI = 0.011:0.053) such that interference was larger for MC
items relative to MI items, producing the ISPC.
CSE analysis
For the CSE items, the average Stroop effect was significant (Mean
effect = −0.034, HDI = −0.044:−0.025) but the effect was not
modulated by prior trial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent,
Mean effect = −0.009, HDI = −0.028:0.011). Furthermore, the
CSE did not interact with the prior item type (MC items vs.
MI items, Mean effect = 0.013, HDI = −0.026:0.051, Bayes
Factor = 41.25).
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 once again clearly demonstrated the
presence of both a robust ISPC effect and a CSE but no hint of an
interaction between these two factors. This replicates our prior
experiments under conditions that minimize associative learning
as a possible mechanism for the ISPC. Thus, the control settings
engaged on Trial N-1 to produce the ISPC do not appear to
differentially influence the interference effect on the subsequent
trial (the CSE).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The primary aim of this work was to examine the relationship
between two purported markers of dynamic adjustments in
attentional control, the ISPC and the CSE. The main finding,
replicated across three experiments, was that although there
was both a robust ISPC and a CSE, these two manipulations
did not interact. In other words, the CSE examined on
Trial N was of a comparable magnitude regardless of the
congruency bias of the stimulus on Trial N-1. Indeed, the
Bayes Factor was quite large (∼9) in support of this null
interaction, within each experiment. Additive factors logic
therefore suggests that the mechanisms responsible for producing
the change in interference reflected in the ISPC are not the
same as the mechanisms producing the CSE, at least in the
present experiments.
These results are consistent with a recent study that indirectly
tested a similar idea. Specifically, Crump et al. (2018) used an
attention capture paradigm that included an ISPC manipulation.
In supplementary analyses, it was shown that sequential effects
(i.e., the CSE) did not interact with the ISPC. We critically
build on this work by a) including a set of well-controlled,
contingency minimized “critical” items on which to assess the
CSE in order to avoid the various confounds that hinder
analysis of the CSE (e.g., Duthoo et al., 2014a) and b using a
standard, vocal-response Stroop task, the quintessential measure
of attentional control, in which most studies have explored both
CSE and ISPC effects.
As already mentioned, both the ISPC and the CSE have been
thought to reflect rapid and dynamic adjustments in attentional
control processes. To the extent that these manipulations
influence the same mechanism, one would expect a design that
manipulates both would produce an interaction. Specifically,
consider a congruent, MI item. Typically, the MI manipulation
would produce an increase in control, due to the frequency
manipulation (i.e., the ISPC) but the item would also be
expected to reduce control due to the fact that it is congruent
(producing the CSE). A priori, one would expect the CSE to be
canceled out or at least minimized in this scenario, producing
a statistical interaction. The robust additive pattern between the
ISPC and CSE obtained in the current series of experiments
would appear to call into question any mechanistic explanation
of the CSE that relies on singular dynamic adjustments
in control processes. Indeed, these results seem to suggest
that the CSE is not a control modulation phenomenon at
all, but rather may result from a more general mechanism
that induces trial by trial changes in the recruitment of
the specific operations that are employed to achieve a given
task based on recent experience. In other words, the specific
operations that are engaged on Trial N (whatever they may
be) are informed by which operations were employed on
the prior trial.
This idea is embodied in the pathway priming account of
Stroop performance noted earlier (Aschenbrenner and Balota,
2015). That is, the use of a particular pathway, either color
or word processing, is primed for use depending on the
extent to which that pathway could be used on the prior
trial. When a congruent trial was just processed, the word
reading pathway is relied upon to a greater extent on the
following trial, since it was a useful pathway to facilitate
processing. Of course, in the context of conflict tasks such
as the Stroop task, “reliance” on a given pathway is also
a reflection of control processes. That is, attentional control
dictates the degree of activation that propagates along any
given pathway. While we are suggesting that pathway priming
is independent from control processes per se, consistent
with the additive effects obtained in the present study, we
acknowledge that the overlap in mechanisms makes totally
disentangling these processes rather difficult. Therefore, the
extent to which local cross-trial changes in the Stroop task
match those from other domains (e.g., visual word recognition
or short-term memory scanning) provides a useful avenue to
understand general mechanisms of dynamic (due to previous
trials) adjustment of stimulus response configurations to
accomplish task goals.
As noted earlier, it is interesting to note that our interpretation
of the CSE is consistent with an established literature on
cross-trial effects in other cognitive domains. For example,
it has been repeatedly shown that in the lexical decision
task, the speed to identify a stimulus as a word or nonword
depends on the perceptual and response characteristics of
both the current and previous trial (Balota et al., 2013;
Masson and Kliegl, 2013). Specifically, if two adjacent trials
are perceptually degraded, RTs are faster compared to when
the perceptual clarity changes across trials. Moreover, if the
lexical status of the previous trial is the same as the current
trial (e.g., two “nonword” targets in a row), there are large
effects of response congruency. We have proposed that this
finding reflects the system adjusting to prepare to process
the same, salient characteristics across trials (Balota et al.,
2018). Importantly, however, large manipulations of variables
known to influence lexical processing (e.g., word frequency)
on Trial N are not influenced by previous trial characteristics
(degradation or lexicality) which is similar to the current
experiments where the CSE on trial N is not influenced by
the ISPC on Trial N-1. Similar findings have been recently
demonstrated in a diverse array of tasks including noun/verb
judgments and short term memory scanning (Aschenbrenner
et al., 2017) and speeded word naming (Zevin and Balota,
2000; Reynolds and Besner, 2005) suggesting that cross-
trial influences is a rather general mechanism and not tied
to tasks that presumably tap attentional control, such as
the Stroop task.
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The present study has many strengths including the
replication of a theoretically important null effect across
multiple experiments and samples, however a few limitations
are worth mentioning. First, we focused only the influence
of the immediately preceding trial. While it is fair to say
this is the standard approach in the field, this approach does
minimize the cumulative influence of multiple serial trials
and may not accurately reflect the time course of control.
For example, Jiménez and Méndez (2013) examined the
CSE as a function of runs of 1, 2, or 3 sequential trials
of the same congruency and they showed the congruency
effect increased as the number of presented congruent
trials increase but the effect decreased when numerous
incongruent trials were presented. However, because the
CSE is greatest from trial N-1 to trial N, the current
study afforded the strongest test of a single trial dynamic
adjustment in control. Second, we began these investigations
under the assumption that the ISPC effect is due to
modulations in attentional control that occur post-stimulus
onset (Jacoby et al., 2003). However, such an interpretation
is still under fierce debate in the literature (Bugg and
Crump, 2012; Schmidt, 2018). As the contingencies of
the items in our experiments still varied across the ISPC
manipulations (even in Experiment 3) whether our results
successfully precluded the contributions of S-R learning
processes cannot be fully determined. At a minimum,
however, these results can serve as a starting point for
additional experimentation that can more cleanly separate these
component processes.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the ISPC and CSE were robustly additive
across three distinct experiments. This pattern suggests
that the CSE reflects an independent, response adjustment
system and may not be related to adjustments in attentional
control per se, at least as reflected by the ISPC effect.
Hence, these results provide evidence of multiple distinct
forms of response dynamics in the premier measure of
attentional control, the Stroop task. The similarity of cross-
trial effects in other standard cognitive tasks that do not
demand high levels of control further question the standard
interpretation of the CSE primarily reflecting dynamic changes
of attentional control.
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